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Abstract
Weoutline twotheories of mathematical language acquisition
and development, and discuss how a computational model of
these theories may help to bridge the gap between automated
theory formation and situated embodied agents. Finally, we
brieﬂy describe a simple theoretical case study of how such a
model could work in the arithmetic domain.
Introduction
It is surprising that little work has been carried out into
the way in which humans develop mathematical language,
both on an individual and social level. A better understand-
ing of the processes by which we learn to represent, store,
communicate, use and develop mathematical ideas would
have great educational potential as well as implications for
other language acquisition, philosophy and psychology of
mathematics, and robotics. The deﬁciency of work in this
area led cognitive scientists Lakoff and N´ u˜ nez to lament in
2001 that (prior to their work) “there was still no discipline
of mathematical idea analysis” (Lakoff and N´ u˜ nez, 2001,
p.XI). A philosophical counterpart to Lakoff and N´ u˜ nez’s
work is Lakatos’s work in the philosophy of mathematics
(Lakatos, 1976). Both theories reject the “romantic” or
“deductivist” style in which mathematics is presented as
an ever-increasing set of universal, absolute, certain truths
which exist independently of humans, arguing instead that
mathematics uses non-absolute, defeasible reasoning.
Lakoff and N´ u˜ nez’s theory of embodied
mathematics
Lakoff and N´ u˜ nez present the thesis that the human embod-
ied mind brings mathematics into being (Lakoff and N´ u˜ nez,
2001). That is, human mathematics is grounded in bodily
experience of a physical world, and mathematical entities
inherit properties which objects in the world have, such as
being stable over time. They review studies which suggest
that babies are able to distinguish one (small) number from
another, to know the size of a small collection of objects (al-
though not necessarily link size to order, so “3” is seen as
different to, but not necessarily as bigger than, “4”), and
to perform very simple arithmetic (see also (Butterworth,
1999)). For the sake of their argument, these abilities are
called innate arithmetic. In order to form more complex
mathematical ideas, we need to be able to form two types
of conceptual metaphor between innate arithmetic and the
more complex arithmetic of natural numbers. Firstly, we
need to be able to make grounding metaphors. These allow
us to project from everyday experiences onto abstract con-
cepts. For instance, we make the metaphor between putting
physical objects into groups, and the abstract concept of ad-
dition. Lakoffand N´ u˜ nezidentifyfourgroundingmetaphors
for arithmetic: forming collections, putting objects together,
using measuring sticks, and moving through space. The
second type of metaphor that we need to be able to make
is a linking metaphor. This consists of blending different
metaphors and yields sophisticated ideas, such as mapping
pointson a line to numbers,algebraicequationsto geometri-
cal ﬁgures, or numbers to sets. Lakoff and N´ u˜ nez argue that
much of the abstraction of higher mathematics is the conse-
quence of this type of systematic layering of metaphor upon
metaphor and they show where mathematical concepts and
laws come from, in terms of these metaphors.
The importance of the environment and our interaction
with it in the development of mathematical ideas and ca-
pabilities is supported by work in mathematics education
and psychology. For instance, Dienes developed a theory of
embodied mathematical knowledge and situated cognition,
claimedthat the environmentis “of outstandingimportance”
inlearningmathematics(Dienes,1973),and, inhis theoryof
theacquisitionofmathematics(discussedin(Taylor,1976)),
argued that interaction with the environment is a fundamen-
talaspectofthreeofthesixstages. Piagetgaveexperiencein
the environment and action central roles in the developmen-
tal process (Piaget, 2001). Choat provides another example
in his argumentthat “all mathematical knowledge originates
fromcontact with objects whichconstitute the environment”
(Choat, 1980, p. 38).Lakatos’s theory of social mathematics
Lakatos charts the evolution of meaning of mathematical
terms via dialectic. His inﬂuences include Hegel’s dialec-
tic, in which the thesis corresponds to a na¨ ıve mathematical
conjecture and proof; the antithesis to a mathematical coun-
terexample; and the synthesis to a reﬁned theorem and proof
(described in these terms in (Lakatos, 1976, pp.144-145)).
Anotherinﬂuence is Plato, and some of the reasoning which
Lakatos describes can be compared to that in Plato’s Repub-
lic, in which arguments are not deductive: the meaning of
terms in the arguments changes over time, and therefore a
term in a premise of an argument may not mean the same as
the same term in the argument’s conclusion. For instance,
Simonides proposes that “it is right to give back what is
owed”. This initial statement is questioned by Socrates with
the counterexample of someone borrowing weapons from a
friendwho subsequentlygoes insane, in which case it would
not be right to return the weapons. The discussion in The
Republic then turns to what it means to give back what is
owed, with Polemarchus suggesting that people owe their
friends good deeds, and their enemies bad ones. The dia-
logue later turns to what the concept of doing right means,
and leads into Plato’s treatment of justice. Another exam-
ple is the change of meaning of the mathematical term “set”
which evolved, in response to Russell’s paradox and other
problems, from Cantor’s “collection of objects” to Zermelo-
Fraenkel’s deﬁnition: “given the set S, and any meaning-
ful property P, it is possible to form the set of all members
of S which satisfy P”. Lakatos calls this type of reason-
ing monster-barring,and gives examplesfrommathematics.
Once the validity of a counterexample has been questioned,
the focus of an argument switches from the truth of the con-
jecture to the meaning of its terms, which is negotiated by
participants in a discussion according to their motivations
and beliefs.
The interface between automated theory
formation and situated embodied agents
A computational model of the embodied and social math-
ematics described above may also help to bridge the gap
between automated theory formation and situated embod-
ied agents. Despite forty years of research into automating
the formation of mathematical theories, there is still no au-
tomated theory formation system which works at the pre-
axiomatic stage or takes cognitively plausible knowledge as
input. Conversely, although the subsumption architecture
framework proposed by Brooks has proven itself in allow-
ing the creation of reactive robots that can deal with the nat-
uralcomplexityoftherealworld,thearchitecturehasproved
somewhat limited in the complexity of the tasks to which it
can be applied.
To allow robots, or embodied agents, to undertake more
complex tasks, a return has been seen to the older sense-
model-plan-act approach but with the robustness to the nat-
uralworldbeingbeingbuiltin atthe modellinglevelthrough
the use of powerfulstatistical techniques (Thrun,2002). Re-
cent work has proposed approacheswhich can build up con-
cepts and rules about the world based on experience gained
from interacting with a stochastic domain (Pasula et al.,
2006; Shanahan, 2005). Being able to reason at a high
level about these rules and concepts would be a powerful
tool for an embodied agent learning about its environment,
especially if such reasoning resulted in testable hypotheses
that the embodied agent could try out in its world. Ground-
ing a system of mathematics via embodied interaction with
an environment would also relate to the symbol grounding
problem; enabling us to provide an account of how mathe-
matical language acquires meaning, and what this meaning
might be.
A computational model of mathematical
language acquisition and development
We are currently drawing from these ideas to produce a
computational model of mathematical language acquisition
and development. Such a model must comprise both an
embodied level where mathematical ideas can be seen as
hidden rules which hold for, or are inspired by, a physi-
cal world (based on Lakoff and N´ u˜ nez’s work), and an ab-
stract level where these ideas are explored and sometimes
changed (based on Lakatos’s theory). We have already de-
velopeda computationalmodelofLakatos’stheoryandused
our model to evaluate his theory (Pease et al., 2002; Pease
et al., 2004). We envisage a 4-stage model in which the
interaction between the embodied agent and the reasoning
software would work in a simple arithmetic domain as de-
scribed below.
An embodiedagent is equippedwith innate arithmetic capa-
bilities such as ability to distinguish small numbers, subitiz-
ing, and perception of simple arithmetic relationships, as
well as cognitive capacities including grouping, ordering,
pairing,memoryandmetaphorizing(see(LakoffandN´ u˜ nez,
2001, pp. 51-52)), as well as ability to select and abstract
common properties (see (Liebeck, 1984)). In the ﬁrst stage
the agent is able to interact with its environment, for ex-
ample, by moving objects around into different piles and
conﬁgurations, and to abstract properties of the group, such
as its size. The agent may remember, or store, the results
of adding a ﬁrst pile to a second pile, and the results of
adding the second pile to the ﬁrst. This embodied inter-
action would lead to a set of concepts and facts about the
environment which would then be passed as input to a the-
ory formation system (which can be achieved with methods
similar to those proposed by (Pasula et al., 2006; Shana-
han, 2005) as described above). In the second stage this
theory formationsystem would abstract and generalise rules
which are descriptive of the patterns it ﬁnds. For example, it
might generatethe commutative axiom of addition (fornatu-
ral numbers a and b, a+b = b+a). The system would thenexplore the search space which the axioms deﬁne, by gener-
ating furtherconcepts, makingconjectures empirically,such
as whenever we subtract 1 from a number then we get an-
other number, and all numbers can be written as the sum of
two numbers, andpassingtheseto a theoremprover. Instage
three, conjectures and theorems would then be passed back
to the embodiedagentforevaluation. Forinstance, the agent
might evaluate relevance by testing whether a theorem can
be instantiated within the world, or interestingness in terms
of whetherthe theoremprovidesa newdescriptionof known
behaviour or describes previously unknown behaviour. The
agent might note that the two conjectures above hold for
every collection of objects except for the collection of one
object. It might then extend its concept of collection to in-
cluding the empty collection, by performing the operation
of removing one object from a collection of just that object
and labelling the result a collection. Finally, in stage four,
the same theory formation program would be used to anal-
yse the informationaboutthe theoremsand axioms andused
to modify the axiom set. If one axiom had only been used
to generate uninteresting theorems then this may be rejected
at this stage. Conversely, for instance, having the “number”
zero in the system might suggest further conjectures which
would justify its inclusion in the theory. If any of the the-
orems contradicted each other then the axioms used would
need to be modiﬁed or rejected.
We would evaluate our model based on whether it could
reinvent concepts such as “zero” or axioms in a cognitively
plausible way, and whether it recognised the interestingness
of such pivotal concepts.
Conclusion
The theories we discuss in embodied and social mathemat-
ics are early characterisations of ways in which people do
mathematics. We hope to build a computational representa-
tion of the theories which, starting from cognitively plausi-
ble innate abilities, models how we interact with an environ-
ment and how we formulate, explore, evaluate and modify
axioms which describe that world. Our goal is to both ex-
tend and evaluate the theories we have discussed. It will be
particularly exciting to further investigate the role that em-
bodied interaction with an environment plays in our human
mathematical development.
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